Foreword	6
	Preface	8
	Introduction	10
	Part I: Full Digital I&C and HMIT Systems	10
	Part II: Risk Monitor Methods for Large and Complex Plants	11
	Part III: Condition Monitors for Plant Components	11
	Part IV: Virtual and Augmented Reality for Nuclear Power Plants	12
	Part V: Software Reliability V&V for Nuclear Power Plants	12
	Acknowledgements	14
	Contents	16
	Part I: Full Digital I&C and HMIT Systems	19
	1: Mitsubishi’s Computerized HSI and Digital I&C System for PWR Plants	20
	1.1 Introduction	20
	1.2 Mitsubishi’s Digital I&C Design Features	21
	1.2.1 Overview System Description	21
	1.2.2 Implementation in New Plants	22
	1.2.3 Digital Upgrading	22
	1.3 HSI System’s V&V Program for Digital I&C Design	22
	1.3.1 Design Features of Mitsubishi’s HSI System	22
	1.3.2 Implementation of the HSI System in the US-APWR	23
	1.3.3 V&V Test Methodology	24
	1.3.4 V&V Results	24
	1.4 Conclusions	25
	References	25
	2: Design of an Integrated Operator Support System for Advanced NPP MCRs: Issues and Perspectives	27
	2.1 Introduction	27
	2.2 Operator Support Systems	28
	2.2.1 What Are Operator Support Systems?	28
	2.2.2 Human Cognitive Process Model of MCR Operators	29
	2.2.3 Operator Support Systems for Cognitive Processes	31
	2.2.3.1 Support Systems for the Monitoring/Detection Activity	31
	2.2.3.2 Support Systems for the Situation Assessment Activity	31
	2.2.3.3 Support Systems for the Response Planning Activity	32
	2.2.3.4 Support Systems for the Response Implementation Activity	32
	2.2.4 Integrated Decision Support System to aid Cognitive Activities of Operators (INDESCO)	32
	2.3 How to Evaluate Operator Support Systems	33
	2.3.1 Theoretical Evaluation Approach Using BBN Model	33
	2.3.1.1 Assumptions for Evaluations	34
	2.3.1.2 BBN Model for Situation Assessment of a Human Operator	34
	2.3.1.3 HRA Event Trees	35
	2.3.1.4 Evaluation Scenarios	35
	2.3.1.5 Evaluation Results	36
	2.3.2 Experimental Evaluation Using Workload and Accuracy	37
	2.3.2.1 Implementation of the Target System	37
	2.3.2.2 Experiment Conditions and Measures	38
	2.3.2.3 Evaluation Results	38
	2.4 Issues and Perspectives for Operator Support Systems	39
	2.4.1 Trust of Operators on Operator Support Systems	39
	2.4.2 Necessary and Useful Information	39
	2.4.3 Evaluation of Operator Support Systems	40
	2.4.4 Operators’ Dependence on Operator Support Systems	40
	2.5 Summary and Conclusion	40
	References	41
	3: Concept of Advanced Back-up Control Panel Design of Digital Main Control Room	43
	3.1 Introduction	43
	3.2 Necessary of Advanced BCP	44
	3.3 Issues for Advanced BCP Design	44
	3.3.1 Design Overview of Advanced BCP	44
	3.3.1.1 Configuration of BCP	44
	3.3.2 Functional Assignment of BCP	44
	3.3.3 Design of QDS-N	45
	3.3.3.1 Allocation	45
	3.3.3.2 System Configuration	46
	3.3.3.3 Diversity	46
	3.3.3.4 Qualification	46
	3.3.3.5 Communication Between QDS-N and PICS	46
	3.3.4 QDS-PAMS	46
	3.3.5 Mini-Overview Display	46
	3.3.6 Backup Indication for QDS PAMS	46
	3.3.7 Optimizing BCP Layout Base on HFE Method	46
	3.3.8 Functional and Task Analysis Optimization	46
	3.4 Conclusion	47
	Nomenclatures	47
	References	47
	4: U.S. Department of Energy Instrumentation and Controls Technology Research for Advanced Small Modular Reactors	48
	4.1 Introduction	48
	4.2 Advanced SMR R&D Program Overview	49
	4.3 DOE Research on ICHMI Technology for SMRs	49
	4.3.1 ICHMI Research Drivers for SMRs	49
	4.3.1.1 Unique Operational and Process Characteristics	50
	4.3.1.2 Affordability	50
	4.3.1.3 Enhanced Functionality	51
	4.3.2 Needs and Challenges for ICHMI Technology Research	51
	4.3.3 DOE Research Activities Under the ICHMI Research Pathway	52
	4.4 Conclusions	53
	References	54
	5: Application of FPGA to Nuclear Power Plant I&C Systems	55
	5.1 Introduction	55
	5.2 Overview of FPGA	56
	5.2.1 FPGA Device	56
	5.2.2 Development of FPGA	56
	5.3 Application of FPGA in NPP	57
	5.3.1 General	57
	5.3.2 Development Process and Verification and Validation Efforts	57
	5.3.3 Equipment Qualification (EQ) and Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Qualification	58
	5.3.4 Standards	58
	5.4 Toshiba FPGA-Based I&C Systems	58
	5.4.1 System Architecture	58
	5.4.2 Power Range Neutron Monitor (PRNM)	59
	5.4.3 RTIS	59
	5.4.4 FPGA-Based Non-safety Systems	60
	5.4.5 Advantage of Toshiba FPGA-Based I&C Systems	60
	5.5 Conclusions	60
	Nomenclatures	61
	References	61
	6: Prejob Briefing Using Process Data and Tagout/Line-up Data on 2D Drawings	62
	6.1 Introduction	62
	6.2 CAD Drawings	63
	6.2.1 Existing Drawings Versus New Drawings	63
	6.2.2 A Generic 2D CAD Format Developed by EDF	63
	6.3 Links Between CAD Business Objects and Other Sources of Data	63
	6.3.1 Business Objects are Central	63
	6.3.2 Overview of the Architecture	63
	6.4 Tagouts and Alignments Preparation on Drawings	64
	6.5 Process Data Visualization on P&ID	65
	6.6 Rapid Application Design Method	65
	6.6.1 The Working with End Users	67
	6.6.2 The Working with the Software Supplier	67
	6.7 Conclusion	68
	Nomenclatures	68
	References	68
	7: Study on Modeling of an Integrated Control and Condition Monitoring System for Nuclear Power Plants	69
	7.1 Introduction	69
	7.2 Overall Scheme of the Integrated Control and Condition Monitoring System	70
	7.2.1 Function Analysis of the Integrated System	70
	7.2.1.1 Control Subsystem Function Analysis	70
	7.2.1.2 Condition Monitoring Subsystem Function Analysis	70
	7.2.1.3 The Overall Function Analysis of the Control and Condition Monitoring Integrated System	70
	7.2.2 System Hardware and Software Requirements	71
	7.2.3 Characteristic Features of the Integrated System and Its Configuration	71
	7.3 Control and Condition Monitoring Integrated System Modeling	73
	7.3.1 Modeling Methods	73
	7.3.1.1 Structured Modeling Methods IDEF0	73
	7.3.1.2 Based on Scene Modeling Method UCM	74
	7.3.1.3 IDEF0/UCM Integrated Modeling Methods	75
	7.3.2 Modeling Study for the Integrated System Based on the IDEF0/UCM Integrated Methods	75
	7.3.2.1 The Overall System Model	75
	7.3.2.2 IDEF0 and UCM Model of the System Module	77
	7.4 Conclusion	79
	Nomenclatures	79
	References	79
	8: A Toolkit for Computerized Operating Procedure of Complex Industrial Systems with IVI-COM Technology	81
	8.1 Introduction	81
	8.2 Hierarchy for Operating Procedure	82
	8.3 Design of Procedure Development Toolkit	82
	8.4 IVI Architecture	83
	8.5 Prototype System of Integrated Tool	84
	8.6 Conclusions and Perspectives	85
	References	86
	9: Development and Design Guideline for Computerized Human–Machine Interface in the Main Control Rooms of Nuclear Power Plants	87
	9.1 Introduction	87
	9.2 Position of JEAG4617 in the Japanese Safety Regulations	88
	9.3 Scope of Application	88
	9.4 Organization of the Guidelines	88
	9.5 Contents of the Guideline	89
	9.5.1 Functional and Design Requirements	89
	9.5.1.1 Functional Requirements	89
	9.5.1.2 Design Requirements	89
	9.5.2 Development and Design Processes	89
	9.5.3 Commentary	89
	9.6 Present Status of the Guideline	89
	9.7 Computerized HMI in the MCR of NPPs in Japan	89
	9.8 Operation in ABWR Type MCR at the Occurrence of the Niigata-Chuetsu- Oki Earthquake	91
	9.9 Conclusions	91
	References	91
	Part II: Risk Monitor Methods for Large and Complex Plants	92
	10: Overview of System Reliability Analyses for PSA	93
	10.1 Introduction	93
	10.2 What Is a System?	93
	10.3 Systems Engineering and Related Fields	94
	10.3.1 Systems Engineering	94
	10.3.2 Operations Research (OR)	94
	10.3.2.1 Cake Shop Example	94
	10.3.2.2 Linear Programming	95
	10.3.2.3 Decision Theory	95
	10.3.2.4 Game Theory	95
	10.3.2.5 Queuing Theory	95
	10.3.3 Industrial Engineering (IE)	95
	10.3.4 Quality Control (QC)	96
	10.4 Probabilistic Safety Assessment	96
	10.5 System Reliability Analysis Methods	96
	10.5.1 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)	97
	10.5.2 Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP)	97
	10.5.3 Reliability Block Diagram (RBD)	97
	10.5.4 Markov Model	97
	10.5.5 Event Tree Analysis (ETA)	98
	10.5.6 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)	99
	10.5.7 GO Methodology	99
	10.5.8 Petri Net	99
	10.5.9 Bayesian Network (BN)	100
	10.5.10 Digraph Matrix	100
	10.5.11 Dynamic Event Tree	101
	10.5.12 Goal Tree-Success Tree (GTST)	101
	10.5.13 Continuous Event Tree	101
	10.5.14 Discrete Event Simulation	101
	10.5.15 Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM)	102
	10.5.16 Cell-to-Cell Mapping Technique (CCMT)	102
	10.5.17 Dynamic Logical Analysis Methodology (DYLAM)	102
	10.5.18 GO-FLOW Methodology	103
	10.5.19 Summary of the System Reliability Analyses	103
	10.6 Summary	103
	10.7 Answer of the Questions	104
	References	104
	11: A Systematic Fault Tree Analysis Based on Multi-level Flow Modeling	106
	11.1 Introduction	106
	11.2 Fault Tree Construction Based on the Model by Multi-level Flow Modeling	107
	11.2.1 Multi-level Flow Modeling	107
	11.2.2 Knowledge and Data for FT Construction	107
	11.2.3 Influence Propagation by the Change of Functional Achievement	108
	11.2.4 FT Construction Algorithm	109
	11.3 FT Construction of a Simple Chemical Plant	109
	11.3.1 Target Chemical Plant	109
	11.3.2 MFM Model for a Cooling Plant of Nitric Acid	109
	11.3.3 FT Construction Results	110
	11.3.4 Discussions	110
	11.4 Conclusions	112
	References	112
	12: Reliability Graph with General Gates: A Novel Method for Reliability Analysis	113
	12.1 Introduction	113
	12.2 Reliability Graph with General Gates	114
	12.2.1 Reliability Graph	114
	12.2.2 Reliability Graph with General Gates	115
	12.2.3 Quantification of the RGGG	115
	12.2.3.1 Transforming to Bayesian Networks	115
	12.2.3.2 Modeling of RGGG	115
	12.2.3.3 OR Node	116
	12.2.3.4 AND Node	117
	12.2.3.5 K-out-of-N Node	117
	12.2.4 Examples	118
	12.3 Extension of the RGGG	118
	12.3.1 Dynamic RGGG	119
	12.3.1.1 Addition of Dynamic Nodes	119
	12.3.1.2 Quantification of Dynamic Nodes	120
	12.3.2 A Software Tool for the Dynamic RGGG	122
	12.3.2.1 Example	122
	12.3.3 Repairable RGGG	123
	12.3.3.1 Availability of Simple Repairable Process	124
	12.3.3.2 Independent Repairable System	124
	12.3.3.3 Dependent Series Repairable System	124
	12.3.3.4 4K/M Redundant Parallel Repairable System	125
	12.3.3.5 Example	126
	12.4 Summary and Conclusions	130
	References	130
	13: Design of Risk Monitor for Nuclear Reactor Plants	132
	13.1 Introduction	132
	13.2 Distributed HMI System	133
	13.3 Risk Monitor	133
	13.3.1 Definition of Risk and Risk Ranking	134
	13.3.1.1 Design Principle of Nuclear Safety	134
	13.3.1.2 Risk to be Monitored	134
	13.3.1.3 Severe Accident Phenomena	134
	13.3.1.4 Risk Ranking	134
	13.3.2 Anatomy of Fault Event Occurrence	135
	13.3.3 Risk Monitor by Semiotic Modeling	136
	13.3.4 Plant DiD Risk Monitor and Reliability Monitor	136
	13.3.5 Visualization as Dynamic Risk Monitor	137
	13.4 Example Practice of a Reliability Monitor	137
	13.4.1 Description of Containment Spray System	137
	13.4.2 FMEA for Containment Spray System	139
	13.4.3 GO-FLOW Analysis for Containment Spray System	139
	13.5 Concluding Remarks	141
	References	141
	14: Review of Practicing Level-2 Probabilistic Safety Analysis for Chinese Nuclear Power Plants	143
	14.1 Introduction	143
	14.2 Review of Each Technical Element	144
	14.2.1 Familiarization with Plant Data and Systems	144
	14.2.2 Interface with Level-1	144
	14.2.3 Containment Performance Analysis	145
	14.2.4 Severe Accident Progression and Containment Event Tree Analysis	145
	14.2.5 Source Term and Release Category Analysis	146
	14.2.6 Sensitivity, Importance, and Uncertainty Analysis	148
	14.2.7 Outcome of Level-2 PSA	148
	14.3 Conclusion	148
	References	148
	15: Risk Monitoring for Nuclear Power Plant Applications Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment	150
	15.1 Introduction	150
	15.2 Characteristics of the Risk Monitoring System COSMOS	151
	15.3 Detailed Functions of COSMOS	151
	15.3.1 COSMOS-FP	151
	15.3.1.1 On-Line Maintenance Scheduling and Risk Evaluation	151
	15.3.1.2 For Successive Execution of Systems and Event Trees (ETs) Corresponding to Exact Plant Conditions (In-Service, Standby or OOS of PSA Equipment)	152
	15.3.1.3 For Realization of Speeding-Up Quantification	152
	15.3.2 COSMOS-SD	153
	15.3.2.1 For Shutdown Scheduling and Risk Evaluation	153
	15.3.2.2 For Improvement of a Shutdown RISKMAN Model to Speed-Up Quantification for Various POS Status	153
	15.4 Risk Monitoring Usage	154
	15.4.1 At-Power Risk Monitoring in Case of On-Line Maintenance (COSMOS-FP)	154
	15.4.2 Shutdown Risk Evaluation for Every Outage (COSMOS-SD)	154
	15.5 Further Enhancements of COSMOS	156
	15.6 Conclusion	156
	Nomenclatures	156
	References	156
	Part III: Condition Monitors for Plant Components	157
	16: Condition Monitoring for Maintenance Support	158
	16.1 Introduction	158
	16.2 Physical Modelling Method	159
	16.2.1 Flow Sheets and Data Reconciliation	159
	16.2.2 Residuals	159
	16.2.3 Statistical Distribution of Residuals	159
	16.2.4 Redundancy	160
	16.2.4.1 Physical Redundancy	160
	16.2.4.2 Analytical Redundancy	160
	16.2.4.3 Apparent Redundancy	161
	16.2.5 Modelling Equations	161
	16.2.5.1 Fundamental Equations	161
	16.2.5.2 Analytical Equations	161
	16.2.5.3 Empirical Equations	161
	16.3 Time Series Analysis	161
	16.4 Analysis of Variances	162
	16.5 Fault Detection in Practice	162
	16.6 Conclusions	163
	References	163
	17: Online Condition Monitoring to Enable Extended Operation of Nuclear Power Plants	164
	17.1 Introduction	164
	17.2 Plant Life Management	165
	17.3 Life-Beyond 60 Years	166
	17.4 Online Measurements in NPPs	167
	17.4.1 Active Components	167
	17.4.2 Passive Components	167
	17.4.2.1 Monitoring Large Defects in Metal Components	168
	17.4.2.2 Monitoring Early Degradation in Metals	170
	17.4.2.3 Primary Containment Structures	171
	17.4.2.4 Cable Condition Monitoring	172
	17.5 Prognostics for the Nuclear Power Industry	173
	17.5.1 Integrated Prognostic	175
	17.6 Technology/Knowledge Gaps	176
	17.7 Conclusions	176
	References	176
	18: Using Condition-based Maintenance and Reliability-centered Maintenance to Improve Maintenance in Nuclear Power Plants	180
	18.1 Introduction	180
	18.2 Comparison of Different Maintenance Strategies in NPPs	181
	18.3 Theoretical Foundation and Methodology of CBM	183
	18.4 Application Experience of CBM in Daya Bay Nuclear Power Base	185
	18.4.1 Optimization of Equipment Maintenance Programme by Introducing CBM Methodologies	185
	18.4.2 The Development of PdM Management System	186
	18.4.3 The Development of Intelligent Failure Diagnosis Expert System	187
	18.5 Conclusion	187
	Nomenclatures	188
	References	188
	19: Advanced Management of Pipe Wall Thinning Based on Prediction-Monitor Fusion	189
	19.1 Introduction	189
	19.2 Pipe Wall Thinning Management	189
	19.3 Prediction by FAC Analyses	190
	19.4 Condition Monitoring	191
	19.5 Reliability Assessment	192
	19.6 New Strategy of PWTM	194
	19.7 Concluding Remarks	194
	References	195
	20: Non-destructive Evaluation of Material State by Acoustic, Electromagnetic and Thermal Techniques	196
	20.1 Introduction	196
	20.2 NDE Using Material Properties	197
	20.2.1 Specimens for NDE Experiments	197
	20.2.2 Acoustic Impedance Method	197
	20.2.3 Magnetoacoustoelasticity	197
	20.2.4 Magnetic Flux Leakage Testing	197
	20.2.5 Thermograph with Magnetic Heating	197
	20.3 NDE of Mechanical Degradation	197
	20.3.1 Specimens	197
	20.3.2 Acoustic Impedance Method	198
	20.3.3 Magnetoacoustoelasticity	198
	20.3.4 Magnetic Flux Leakage Testing	199
	20.3.5 Thermograph with Magnetic Heating	199
	20.4 NDE of Plastic Strain and Residual Stress	199
	20.4.1 Specimens	199
	20.4.2 Acoustic Impedance Method	200
	20.4.3 Magnetoacoustoelasticity	201
	20.4.4 Magnetic Flux Leakage Testing	202
	20.4.5 Thermograph with Magnetic Heating	203
	20.5 Conclusion	204
	References	204
	21: Non-contact Acoustic Emission Measurement for Condition Monitoring of Bearings in Rotating Machines Using Laser Interferometry	205
	21.1 Introduction	205
	21.2 Experimental System	206
	21.3 Experimental Results and Discussion	207
	21.4 Conclusions	213
	References	213
	22: Crack Growth Monitoring by Strain Measurements	214
	22.1 Introduction	214
	22.2 Crack Growth Monitoring Method	215
	22.2.1 Basic Procedure	215
	22.2.2 Procedure for Multiple Strain Measurements	216
	22.3 Experiment	217
	22.3.1 Experimental Procedure	217
	22.3.2 Experimental Results	217
	22.4 Estimation of Crack Size	219
	22.4.1 Finite Element Analysis	219
	22.4.2 Estimation Using Single Strain Gage	219
	22.4.3 Estimation Using Multiple Strain Gages	220
	22.5 Discussion	220
	22.6 Conclusion	221
	References	221
	23: Acoustic Monitoring of Rotating Machine by Advanced Signal Processing Technology	223
	23.1 Introduction	223
	23.2 Signal Processing Methods	224
	23.2.1 Pre-processing for Feature Extraction	224
	23.2.1.1 Log-Scale Auto-Power Spectral Density (log-APSD)	224
	23.2.1.2 Mel-Scale Auto-Power Spectral Density (Mel-scale-APSD)	224
	23.2.1.3 Cepstrum [ 5 ]	224
	23.2.2 Dimension Reduction for Visualization	225
	23.2.2.1 PCA Based Classification	225
	23.2.2.2 KPCA Based Classification [ 6, 7 ]	225
	23.2.2.3 Heuristic Classification	225
	23.2.3 State Discrimination for Anomaly Monitoring	226
	23.2.3.1 State Discrimination by PNN [ 8 ]	226
	23.2.3.2 State Discrimination by SVDD [ 9 ]	226
	23.3 Test Results	227
	23.3.1 Test Facility and Measurement	227
	23.3.2 Evaluation of Classification Performance of PCA, KPCA and a Heuristic Method	227
	23.3.3 Discrimination Results by PNN and SVDD	229
	23.4 Conclusions	230
	References	231
	24: The Wireless Diagnostic System for Motor Operated Valves	232
	24.1 Introduction	232
	24.2 Development of New Diagnostic System	233
	24.2.1 Points and Features	233
	24.2.2 Outline of Diagnostic Method	233
	24.2.3 Mock-Up Test Results	233
	24.2.4 Confirmation of Design Base Performance	233
	24.3 Development of Wireless Remote Diagnostic System	234
	24.3.1 Background of the Development	234
	24.3.2 Outline of Wireless Remote Diagnostic System	234
	24.4 Conclusions	236
	References	236
	Part IV: Virtual and Augmented Reality for Nuclear Power Plants	237
	25: Virtual and Augmented Reality in the Nuclear Plant Lifecycle Perspective	238
	25.1 Introduction	238
	25.1.1 The Halden Boiling Heavy Water Reactor	239
	25.1.2 Safety MTO: Man Technology Organisation	239
	25.1.3 Halden Virtual Reality Centre (HVRC)	239
	25.1.4 Definition of Virtual Reality	240
	25.1.5 Definition of Augmented Reality	240
	25.1.6 Areas of Use of VR and AR at IFE	240
	25.2 VR and AR in Design	240
	25.2.1 Reuse of 3D Models in the Design Phase	241
	25.2.2 Control Room Design and Validation Using VR	241
	25.2.3 User-Friendly AR Technology for Real World Use	242
	25.2.3.1 The AR Solution Developed at IFE	242
	25.2.3.2 The Role of AR in the Plant Life Cycle	242
	25.3 VR in Operation and Maintenance	243
	25.3.1 Requirements to Training Safer Refuelling	243
	25.3.2 VR Applications at LNPP for Training	243
	25.3.3 Creating Up-to-Date Data and 3D Models	244
	25.3.4 Use of the VR Solutions in Daily Training	244
	25.3.5 Future Enhancements for Use on New Scenarios	244
	25.4 VR in Decommissioning	244
	25.4.1 Challenges in Decommissioning Planning	245
	25.4.2 Establishing a Visualisation Centre at ChNPP	246
	25.4.3 Overall Features of the CDVC	246
	25.4.4 Reducing Radiation Exposure Dose Using VR	246
	25.4.5 Efficient Reuse of 3D Data	246
	25.5 Future Plans at LNPP and ChNPP	246
	25.6 Nuclear Energy’s Role in Future Sustainable Energy Supplies	246
	25.6.1 VR and AR Contribution to the Nuclear Safety for Symbiosis and Sustainability	247
	25.7 Summary	248
	References	249
	26: A Feasibility Study on Worksite Visualization System Using Augmented Reality for Fugen NPP	251
	26.1 Introduction	251
	26.2 Decommissioning of Fugen	251
	26.2.1 Outline of Fugen	251
	26.2.2 Decommissioning Program of Fugen	252
	26.2.3 Current Status of Decommissioning	254
	26.3 Decommissioning Engineering Support System (DEXUS)	255
	26.4 Worksite Visualization System (WVS)	255
	26.4.1 Reference Support for Cutting Lines and Restraint Parts	256
	26.4.2 Record Support for Progress of Dismantling	256
	26.4.3 Prototype System Development	256
	26.4.3.1 Realization of Superimposing 3D CAD Data	256
	26.4.3.2 Cutting Function of 3D CAD Data	257
	26.4.3.3 User Interface and Hardware	257
	26.5 Feasibility Evaluation of WVS	258
	26.5.1 Purpose and Outline of Evaluation	258
	26.5.2 Evaluation Method	258
	26.5.2.1 Evaluation Environment	258
	26.5.2.2 Evaluators	258
	26.5.2.3 Dismantling Scenario	258
	26.5.2.4 Procedure of Evaluation	259
	26.5.2.5 Questionnaire	259
	26.5.3 Evaluation Result	259
	26.5.4 Discussion	259
	26.5.5 System Function	260
	26.5.6 Usability	261
	26.6 Summary	261
	References	261
	27: Augmented Reality for Improved Communication of Construction and Maintenance Plans in Nuclear Power Plants	262
	27.1 Introduction	262
	27.2 Augmented Reality	263
	27.2.1 AR Binoculars	263
	27.3 Real World Applications	264
	27.3.1 Augmented Reality and Construction	264
	27.3.2 Augmented Reality and Training of Operators	265
	27.3.3 Augmented Reality and Maintenance	266
	27.4 Conclusion	267
	References	267
	28: 3D Representation of Radioisotopic Dose Rates Within Nuclear Plants for Improved Radioprotection and Plant Safety	268
	28.1 Introduction	268
	28.2 EDF CZT Gamma Spectrometer	269
	28.2.1 Acquisitions	269
	28.2.2 Spectral Analysis	270
	28.3 Dose Calculations	270
	28.4 Combining Radiological Information and VR	271
	28.4.1 Example 1: Optimising Shielding	271
	28.4.1.1 Visualising Radioisotopic Dose Maps	271
	28.4.2 Example 2: Radiation Decay	272
	28.5 Discussion and Conclusions	273
	References	274
	29: Wide Area Tracking Method for Augmented Reality Supporting Nuclear Power Plant Maintenance Work	275
	29.1 Introduction	275
	29.2 Proposal of a Tracking Method Using Multi-range Markers	276
	29.2.1 Design of Multi-range Markers	276
	29.2.2 Algorithm to Recognize Multi-range Markers	276
	29.2.3 Algorithm to Calculate the Relative Position and Orientation Between a Camera and Markers	278
	29.3 Evaluation of the Proposed Method	278
	29.3.1 Recognition Range	278
	29.3.2 Stability of Marker Recognition Under Variable Illumination Conditions	279
	29.3.3 Processing Speed of Tracking	279
	29.3.4 Misrecognition of Markers	279
	29.3.5 Area Within Which Tracking Can Be Executed	279
	29.4 Conclusions	280
	References	281
	Part V: Software Reliability V&V for Nuclear Power Plants	282
	30: Research on Software Systems Dependability at the OECD Halden Reactor Project	283
	30.1 Introduction	283
	30.2 Software Safety Integrity	284
	30.3 The Research Problems	285
	30.3.1 Software Development	285
	30.3.2 Software Assurance	286
	30.3.3 Software Approval and Deployment	287
	30.4 Safety Demonstration	288
	30.5 Conclusions	288
	References	289
	31: High Level Issues in Reliability Quantification of Safety-Critical Software	290
	31.1 Introduction	290
	31.2 BBN Modeling	291
	31.2.1 Assessment Approaches	291
	31.2.2 Consideration on Evidence	291
	31.2.3 Cause-Consequence Relation	292
	31.3 Statistical Testing	293
	31.4 Conclusions	294
	Nomenclature	294
	References	294
	32: Software Reliability Analysis in Probabilistic Risk Analysis	296
	32.1 Introduction	296
	32.2 State-of-the-Art of Software Reliability in PRA for Nuclear Power Plants	296
	32.2.1 Software Reliability	296
	32.2.2 Software Reliability Quantification	297
	32.2.3 Software Reliability Estimation in PRA	297
	32.2.3.1 Screening Out Approach	297
	32.2.3.2 Screening Value Approach	298
	32.2.3.3 Expert Judgement Approach	298
	32.2.3.4 Operating Experience Approach	298
	32.2.4 Conclusions on Software Reliability in PRA	298
	32.3 Failure Modes Taxonomy	299
	32.3.1 Background	299
	32.3.2 General Approach	299
	32.3.3 Requirements for the Failure Modes Taxonomy	299
	32.3.4 Levels of Details of the Taxonomy	300
	32.3.5 Failure Modes	300
	32.4 Safety Justification Framework	300
	32.4.1 Safety Case	300
	32.4.2 Software Reliability Assessment Case	301
	32.4.3 Software Reliability Claims	301
	32.4.4 Bayesian Belief Network (BBN)	301
	32.4.5 Types of Evidence	301
	32.4.6 BBN Model Suggestions in HARMONICS	302
	32.5 Conclusions	302
	Nomenclatures	303
	References	303
	About the Editors	305
	Author Index	307
	Subject Index	309